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A new wave of populism appears to be sweeping across Europe; western and eastern. Populist leaders have sprouted all over, gaining (or having gained) public support. A new narrative, an alternative brand of politics is being shaped. The trend is evident all over — from the United States of America to Britain to France, and even in Greece, Finland, Hungary and Poland. Most of it is Right-wing; some Left-driven. Donald Trump’s election as the next President of the US; the Brexit referendum in Britain; the rise of Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France; the increasing consolidation of Greece’s Syrzia party — these should all be seen in the larger context of a redefining of the political mood in Europe. It’s only the beginning. Time will tell whether the trend represents a momentary deviation from ‘old politics’, a mere blip in a nations (or continent’s) political history, or a harbinger of a ‘new era’.

How are these developments relevant to the structuring of politics in India, besides the fact that New Delhi’s political and diplomatic outreach, pre-set until recently to match the Cold War decades and from the delusions of ‘non-alignment’ concept, will need considerable recalibration (some of it is already happening)? Additionally, the definition of ‘populist politics’ is not quite the same in India as it has become in Europe, if for no reason other than that of the vast difference in the issues the two entities face. At yet, at least some of the roots of this populism as an attractive option, are shared by Europe and India.

Also, the line between populism and popular in the context of leaders and their leadership styles gets blurred more often in India, motivated by conditions that are unique to this nation, though this is increasingly the case in all of Europe too in some measure. Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to juxtapose to a reasonable extent, the recent experiences of India and Europe, draw similarities, identify differences, and deliberate on the reasons that have led to such bursts of populism — in India’s case, not always at a national level but more often in the States. If we begin on an assumption that populism is bad, we are still left with the task of understanding what has led to its rise — after all, there must have been valid reasons, something seriously wrong with the ‘establishment’ — real or perceived — that allowed populism to seep into the public consciousness. And, if populism is not as bad as many project it to be, why then is the ‘establishment’ out to vilify it as a poorly cloaked attempt to change the paradigms of humanism, multiculturalism, global integration — and worse? Why would vast numbers of the population reject the ‘establishment’ in favour of such so-called populism?

The rise of populism in Europe has been serious enough for the respected Foreign Affairs magazine, published by the US-based Council on Foreign Affairs, to devote nearly its entire November-December issue to the subject. Titled, ‘The Power of Populism’, the cover story, through a bunch of contributions from some of the world’s leading experts, seeks to contextualise the new phenomenon. While India obviously does not figure in them (given that the focus is on Europe), many indicators are relevant to the Indian context as well. Without exception, the analysts have held that populism is negative; that while it does not create conditions for revolt against the establishment, it certainly exploits those conditions; that the issues it raises are in the broader sense relevant (though it exaggerates them); that whenever the establishment fails to address concerns of the people, it provides fuel to populism to gain ground.

In the Indian context, one does not have to go too far back than 2013-14. The massive anti-corruption movement led by social activist Anna Hazare gave birth to the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), which came to power in Delhi riding on the crest of populism. The conditions for its rise were created by the Manmohan Singh-led UPA Government which was perceived as riddled with corruption. The regime did nothing to cor-rect the impression, which turned from bad to worse. The AAP exploited the circumstance to the hilt, giving out populist slogans of jailing everyone involved in the various scams if it were voted in. Such was the public outrage that, led alone an ‘outsider’, even a mainstream political party such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), benefitted. Driven by Narendra Modi’s charisma, it came to power at the Centre, bagging an absolute majority — the first by any party in 30 years.

Nearly every contributor in Foreign Affairs noted that populism essentially caters to the baser instincts of the majority, that it seeks to divide society through ethno-cultural lines, and that it works towards the creation of an illiberal set-up. That may be true of Europe, but does not necessarily hold valid for India. Let’s take the example of populist parties like the Trinamool Congress led by Mamata Banerjee, the Bahujan Samaj Party headed by Mayawati, the Samajwadi Party lorded over by Mulayam Singh Yadav, and the AAP helmed by Arvind Kejriwal. While all of these do exploit the baser instincts, they target not the majority but the minority as their vehicle of expression. These four leaders have constructed their politics on the appeasement of the minorities (one minority community specifically because it offers them the bigger chunk of votes). The growth of minority fundamentalism and subsequent unrest in West Bengal among the minorities are direct consequences of this political approach of patronage. Of course, the trend began during the three-decade uninterrupted Left Front rule in the State, but it has gained momentum in the present regime. The SP and the BSP have been equally eager to humour the minority, but in addition they have also created a social divide of a different kind: Along caste lines. Indeed, their politics rests on the twin pillars of caste and religion.

In the larger sense, instead of working towards a fuller integration of the minorities into the Indian sociocultural mainstream, these parties and their leaders have done exactly the opposite in the name of seeking to maintain cultural diversity. Interestingly, the commentaries in Foreign Affairs harp on the dangers that are prevalent in the rise of populism, to the ‘non-pure’ nationalities of European nations. They argue that populism feeds on the resentment of the majority towards the minority. In the US, as in France, it is against the immigrants, against the Muslims, against the blacks. In India, it feeds on the insecurity (mostly created) among the minorities.

Populism has also been associated with aggressive nationalism. One writer in Foreign Affairs attributed Trump’s rise on the centre-stage to his belligerent brand of racial-nationalism. In India, this is the case with critics of the Modi Government. Nationalism has been made out to be a cuss word with which they can beat the regime. Since nationalism in itself is inoffensive, the Prime Minister’s opponents have turned it into ‘ultra-nationalism’. Thus, those who demand respect to the National Anthem and the National Song, who promote yoga, who speak of the need to patronise the growth of our ancient language, Sanskrit, who talk of ‘India First’ — they are all ultra-nationalists. But, as voters have shown here, as they have in the US (the results were not yet out when the Foreign Affairs magazine went into print, and so most commentators prayed and hoped that Trump would lose), they do hold nationalism dear to their heart. This is not populism in the negative sense.

Apart from ultra-nationalism, the one other word which is in currency ever since the Modi Government took charge and which is used to demean the regime and its leader, is fascism. A Western commentator would be amazed at the various ways the term is applied by the Government’s political rivals in India, and always in contexts that are far removed from that in which the word came into existence and be interpreted. Now, populism across the West is being seen as a form of fascism. Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, writes in Foreign Affairs that “right-wing populism — indeed, populism of any kind — is a symptom of democracy in trouble; fascism and other revolutionary movements are the consequence of democracy in crisis”. The writer also hopes that the likes of Trump and Le Pen turn out to be “also-rans”. Well, Trump has turned out to be anything but an also-ran; Le Pen too could follow in Trump’s footsteps. Back in India, there is not the slightest hint of fascism gaining root. The Government at the Centre in India came on the back of a public mandate, its policies and actions have not sought to either benefit one particular group or decimate another section of society, and it has not pledged to protect one set of people (defined in communal or racial terms) against another set. There is no extermination, no concentration camp. Critics of the Government, as those of its opponents, have a free run. It’s true that the persona of the Prime Minister looms large over the Government and that he has the final say on important matters. But isn’t this how it should be, even in a democracy? A strong rather than a waffling leader is not indicative of fascism.

The power of populism is a reflection of the failure of democratic institutions to address the concerns of a vast majority of the population. The Great Depression, which hit Europe a decade after the end of the First World War, almost brought the US to its knees. It also as deeply impacted Germany. But as Sheri Berman says in the Foreign Affairs essay, the two countries reacted differently to the crisis — sharp hike in unemployment, fall in production, business collapses — and created different political histories. Berman writes, “In Germany the Weimar Republic then fell to the Nazi onslaught, whereas in the United States, democracy survived — despite the appearance of some pseudo-fascist leaders such as the Louisiana politician Huey Long and the radio preacher father Charles Coughlin.” This happened, as the author points out, because the Franklin D Roosevelt regime in the US used the occasion to lay the foundation of a modern welfare state. More importantly, it did not allow the democratic system to be undermined. On the other hand, the democratic set-up in Germany just crumbled, with even the Opposition, the Social Democrats, surrendering meekly to the Nazi rise. Germany’s then leaders, in Berman’s words, “did little to ease their (people’s) suffering; in fact they pursued policies of austerity, which exacerbated the economic downturn in general and the horrifically high rates of unemployment in particular”. That’s how Adolf Hitler and his team came into being.

India’s context is similar to that of the US and not Germany, but this is something that critics of the Modi Government refuse to acknowledge. In fact, India is a step ahead of the US. While the US may be the world’s oldest democracy, it has not faced an onslaught to its democratic cre-dentials of the kind that India did, in 1975 during Emergency. The fact that this country fought back that insult to democracy by ousting a leader of the stature of Indira Gandhi, is a remarkable tribute to democracy’s resilience. In the State of Jammu & Kashmir, despite militant threats and calls for boycott, voters have been coming out in large numbers to vote for Assembly and Lok Sabha elections held through a free, fair and transparent process. This too is democracy at its best. There is no Hitler or Mussolini lurking round the bend in India; at worst, there are populist leaders with parochial agendas, but they too meet their Waterloo sometime or the other. And, it’s not just the political crisis of Emergency; even an economic disaster of the kind that existed in 1991 did not lead to a surge in negative populism across the nation, not did it throw up divisive leaders. The 1991 economic situation, when PV Narasimha Rao took over and Prime Minister, with Manmohan Singh as his Finance Minister, was almost as hopeless as that of the Great Depression. And yet, through an established democratic process, the Government pulled the country out of the morass and laid the foundation of a liberal economy that no regime since then has dared to alter. Indeed, subsequent economic policies of the country have premised their arguments on the 1991 format.

There is no debate that conditions which get created for the rise of populism — whether of the revolutionary or of the more pacifist kind, whether Left or Right — are the doing of the establishment. This has been settled over and over again. However, simply because a leader decides to cash in on an anti-establishment sentiment, the intent cannot be questioned as negative populism, at least not as a rule. Marine Le Pen of France is today poised to give a good shot at the French presidency, especially with reports that incumbent President Francois Hollande may not contest for a second term. In an interview to Foreign Affairs, she offers cogent examples of why she has taken the (hardline) position she has. On supporting a ban on the burkini, she had this to say: “Once we accept that women are subject to this Islamic uniform, the next step is that we accept the separation of sexes in swimming pools and other public places. And then we’ll have to accept different rights for men and women. If you don’t see that, then you don’t understand the battle we face against Islamic fundamentalism.” It is difficult to find fault with this populist argument — something that connects with near similar choices we face in this country in the debate over triple talaq, a common civil code etc. Further, defending her earlier statement that apart from Islam, no other religion causes problems (in France), Le Pen said that fundamentalists within the community had failed to integrate into the French secular ethos because they considered the Sharia’h as the supreme authority — higher than the laws of the country. Again, an echo of things similar to what we have back in India.

This, then, brings us to the final question: Can populist and popular co-exist in the same party or leader? There are some examples of this co-existence: Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik, Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar and Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan. While they have all catered to some populist sentiment or the other, whether it be providing cheap food grain or prohibition of liquor or sops to tribals etc, these leaders have also not abandoned hard economics. Moreover, they are not, unlike some of the populists of Europe and the US, raring to dismantle the existing political or democratic system. They may not appease sections of the population through crass commentary, but they don’t ignore grievances or allow the discontent to overflow and be harnessed by the really dangerous populists for destructive agendas.

While liberals across the world must be hoping that populism will turn out to be episodic in Europe (the Austria election result will give them cheer, as the leader of the far-Right has lost the race in a re-run), in India, there is no danger from populism of the malignant kind. Still, there is no room for complacency.

Rajesh Singh
13 December 2016

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